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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
11 October 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA



South Korea: According to the press, demonstrations have taken place in Seoul, Taegu, and Masan--centers of the revolt that toppled former President Rhee from power last April. Demonstrators charge the government with failure to uphold the spirit of the revolution and protest the "light" punishment given former high officials of the old regime. South Korean military and police forces are reported to have been alerted to maintain order in the event of a popular uprising demanding the ouster of the Chang Myon government. Press reports thus far, however, have given no indication of the size or scope of these new demonstrations. Should disturbances erupt on a large scale, the effectiveness with which the military and police would act to maintain order may be reduced by the recent purges of personnel in these services.

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Laos: The provincial government and the military command of Xieng Khouang Province, in northeastern Laos, have switched their allegiance back to General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee, apparently as the result of pressure from Meo tribesmen, who constitute a major ethnic group in the province. General Amkha, Vientiane garrison commander, who was sent out by Vientiane to act in a liaison capacity for the short time the province was loyal to the Souvanna Phouma government, has been arrested and flown to Savannakhet. This apparent bolstering of Phoumi's position may increase his resistance to any further effort by Souvanna Phouma to persuade him to end his opposition to the government.

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Pakistan-Afghanistan: The Pakistani Government apparently intends to exploit the current border friction to increase its presence in tribal areas on the Pakistani side of the frontier which have been traditionally autonomous. The recent arrest of the rulers of two tribal regions for "double-dealing" probably is motivated by Rawalpindi's desire to install more amenable leaders and to deploy border security forces in this sector closer to the Durand line. This action may encounter serious resistance among the local tribes, and probably will be seized on by Kabul as evidence of Pakistan's "repression" of the Pushtoon people. Border clashes apparently are continuing on a smaller scale than in September. While elements of the quasi-military border security forces have been involved, none of the regular military forces being moved to the vicinity of the tribal areas have been committed. OK

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Demonstrators Demand Ouster of South Korean Government

Demonstrations demanding Prime Minister Chang Myon's resignation and dissolution of South Korea's parliament have taken place in Seoul, Taegu, and Masan--centers of the revolt that toppled former President Rhee from power last April. Press reports have given no indication of the size or scope of the demonstrations, but state that the demonstrators have charged the government with failure to uphold the spirit of the April revolution and have protested the "light" punishment given former high officials of the old regime. Military and police forces are reported to have been alerted to maintain order.

Hampered by political factionalism, the Chang administration has failed to display the dynamic leadership expected by the people after the April revolution. Growing unrest and dissatisfaction has been suggested by continued student demonstrations, agitation among lower ranking military officers, and strong press criticism of the administration. According to police figures, there have been over 1,500 demonstrations since April.

In the event of new large-scale disturbances the effectiveness with which the military and police would act to maintain order and support the Chang government may be reduced by the recent purges of personnel. Military discipline probably has been weakened by recent command changes and agitation among lower ranking officers for the removal of senior commanders identified with the former government. The police, discredited for their actions under the Rhee regime and subsequently subjected to repeated purges, have as yet displayed little capability for maintaining order.

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The northeastern province of Xieng Khouang, after an interlude of about twelve days during which it supported the Souvanna Phouma government, has again swung its allegiance to General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. The circumstances leading to the switch are somewhat obscure, but tribal unrest among the Meos--a major ethnic group in the province--may have played an important role. General Amkha, the Vientiane garrison commander who was sent to represent the Souvanna government following the province's switch of support to Souvanna, has reportedly been arrested and flown to Savannakhet. Phoumi should have little difficulty effecting Amkha's defection if he should so choose; Amkha has shown a tendency to vacillate ever since the Kong Le coup.

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In Vientiane, [redacted] claims to have warned Captain Kong Le on 7 October of the dangers posed by the growing strength of the Pathet Lao in the capital. He noted, however, that Kong Le was "so volatile" that he could not be relied on to pursue any agreed-upon course of action to its conclusion. [redacted] the real problem in Kong Le's Second Parachute Battalion was a deputy, Lt. Deuane, who he says was responsible for organizing a leftist youth rally in Vientiane on 4 October against the wishes of the government.

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Premier Souvanna meanwhile has told Ambassador Brown in Vientiane that he will insist in the forthcoming peace talks that the Pathet Lao cease attacks throughout the country and return Sam Neua Province to government administration. If the Pathet Lao refuse these demands, Souvanna claims he will break off negotiations.

The minister of public works in the Souvanna regime has informed an American Embassy officer that Burma has agreed to sell foodstuffs and other merchandise to Laos. The goods would be delivered at the Laos-Burma border and brought by river craft to Luang Prabang and Vientiane via the Mekong River. The official stated the plan would be implemented as an alternative source of supply should the Thai blockade of Vientiane continue. Motor fuel has already been flown from Burma to Vientiane, however.

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Afghan-Pakistani Border Situation

The Pakistani Government apparently intends to use the current border trouble with Afghanistan as a pretext to increase its presence in frontier tribal areas which, although located within Pakistan, have enjoyed considerable autonomy.

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Relations between the central government and Dir long have been strained, and Rawalpindi probably views the present Afghan-Pakistani border friction as a good excuse to intervene and install a more amenable ruler. Reports in Rawalpindi indicate that another son of the Nawab will be named as his successor. Pakistani authorities probably also feel their intervention now will make it possible for border security forces to be positioned directly on the Durand line, thereby affording a means of controlling contact between tribal elements on either side of the frontier.

The arrest of the Nawab of Dir may, however, arouse considerable resentment among the local tribes and cause them to resist forcibly attempts by Rawalpindi to extend its control over the region. Kabul is likely to seize on the arrests to step up its propaganda campaign denouncing Pakistani "repression" of the Pushtoon people.

Skirmishing is continuing along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier, although on a smaller scale than in September. Despite reports from Kabul that Pakistani "troops" have been involved,

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[redacted]  
there is still no evidence that Rawalpindi has committed regular army forces. Units of the quasi-military border security forces, however, have been sent to the troubled Bajour area--placing them on this sector of the frontier apparently for the first time--and reportedly have been involved in some of the fighting. [redacted]

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[redacted]  
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